

**The 1982 Essex Hall Lecture**

**LESSENING  
THE NUCLEAR  
THREAT**

**A Defence of  
Unilateralism**

**Dr. Homer A. Jack**

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# Lessening the Nuclear Threat

## A Defence of Unilateralism

I am especially pleased to deliver this lecture here in Wales. The only other time I visited this treasured region of the United Kingdom was in the early 1960s when I journeyed to Penrhyndeudraeth to spend a day talking nuclear issues with Bertrand Russell. Twenty years have gone by and at least 40,000 more nuclear weapons have been stockpiled, yet the urgent concern for nuclear peace articulated by that modern Welsh giant is still vividly remembered by a whole generation. Russell and Albert Einstein made a poignant plea in 1955 to the entire world community: "We appeal, as human beings to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest." This constitutes the text for this lecture.

I have been asked to focus this lecture on religion and peace. Even more than in the final decades of the lives of Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, peace and disarmament have the highest priority of any topic today. However, I must initially warn you that I speak with several biases. I am an American (at a moment when Americans are not exactly cherished by many Western Europeans!); I am a Unitarian Universalist; I am a professional "do-gooder" in the fields of peace, disarmament, and human rights. I am a longtime follower, if often a faithless one, of Mohandas Gandhi; I am a pacifist. I am a democratic socialist (a rarity as an American), but usually more disenchanted with the Soviet Union than with my own country. So these are some of my biases. I give you fair warning so that you can make your own discount for my prejudices. One final bias: I am old and thus I need no longer be cautious. I will hardly be ostracized, fired, or jailed for whatever I say. I can be prophetic if not reckless, for I may not live to know whether my predictions and my proposals work or not. But picture an advocate of disarmament who, in the moment of nuclear holocaust, mutters: my prediction was true! Indeed, I hope and pray that, as old as I am, I will live to see

that my prediction of nuclear detonation is false, and that humanity - and your children and grandchildren and mine - survive the nuclear danger, whether because of my proposals or others.

This lecture is, in a sense, a continuation of one that I gave in August 1979 to the Third Assembly of the World Conference on Religion and Peace at Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A., in my capacity as Secretary-General. At that time I called for "The New Abolitionism", a "great new movement to begin to build a worldwide moral and religious crusade which will say 'no' to nuclear war and 'no' to the nuclear arms race as the Old Abolitionism launched a crusade to say 'no' to slavery." I added that "this New Abolitionism against this new form of slavery can be a religious crusade; it can be a winning crusade. In any case, it is a necessary crusade." (ref 1) My lecture, given almost three years ago, did not exactly start a crusade, but I persist in calling for a halt to nuclear nonsense, this time suggesting still a new dimension in this effort.

The Essex Hall Lecture has religious sponsorship. I want to approach the nuclear predicament partly from a religious dimension. We Unitarians have long been concerned about world peace. We may not be able to compete in our interest, or accomplishments, with the Society of Friends, but Unitarians on both sides of the Atlantic have long been deeply involved with efforts to establish new institutions to make and keep the peace. Unitarian Universalists in nineteenth century New England spoke and organized for world peace. In more recent times, John Haynes Holmes, John Lathrop, Henry Pinkham, Donald Harrington, Linus Pauling, and a host of other religious liberals worked actively for disarmament through the Unitarian Universalist Peace Fellowship and other institutions. The involvement of the Unitarian Universalist Association of North America, under the presidency of Dr. Dana McLean Greeley, against the Viet Nam War is well known. (ref 2) In the British Isles there has been parallel concern, and I remember the leadership of Reginald Sorenson. Name a disarmament campaign in North America or Western Europe, and you will find a religious liberal as one of its leaders.

Today, fortunately, the Quakers and we religious liberals are not alone. No longer must we seek comfort in tiny denominational pacifist fellowships. Today whole denominations are working for peace and disarmament. It has not always been so. For several decades most religious leaders have not focused on nuclear ethics.

The West German physicist, Prof. Carl F. von Weizsäcker, some years ago used a term in German which some have felt helpful: *Gnadenfrist* (ref 3). It means a period of postponement of execution. He felt that the world, while condemning nuclear weapons, could use the time wisely to promote an alternative with non-nuclear security systems. However, the interim has not been used wisely, by theologians or secularists, and the chances of the nuclear guillotine coming down to execute us all now seems greater. Still, nuclear concern has suddenly intensified, including the concern in the religious world.

Pope John Paul II has been talking - and acting - magnificently for nuclear peace. In his January 1979 message he asked that we "make gestures of peace, even audacious ones, to break free from vicious circles and from the dead-weight of passions inherited from history ... The hour is ripe and time presses." Not only are Christians and Jews in the West and "North" advocating disarmament, but also Buddhists and Hindus in the East and "South". This is truly a multi-religious moment for peace, even if still masses of people in church and synagogue, in mosque and temple, are not yet involved.

I began writing this lecture in Boston, in New England, before Christmas, surrounded by my two children and two grandchildren. Indeed, this lecture must be dedicated to them, and to children everywhere, for it is they who may suffer most by the nuclear folly of our generation. Just at a time when biological science is extending the life span of human beings in most countries of our world, military science is truncating the life expectancy of all humanity because of the nuclear threat. The half-life of radioactivity has an analogue in the possibly curtailed life of all human beings.

Let me now describe briefly the political atmosphere in which I composed this lecture. Let us look backwards three and one-half months when necessarily I had to write this lecture in order for it to be printed in advance. Perhaps we can see the seeds of some of the events occurring today. When I began to write in December, U.S. leaders were still deploring the "unilateralism" and "pacifism" which sent many hundred thousand Western Europeans through the streets denouncing both NATO and Warsaw Pact intermediate-range missiles, both those in place and those to be deployed. When I began writing, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were

just concluding the first three weeks of their European theatre nuclear missile talks in Geneva. The U.S. Congress had just approved President Reagan's record 200 billion dollars annual military budget. Prime Minister Begin had just extended Israeli jurisdiction to the Golan Heights, despite unanimous Security Council censure. The Polish military had just begun its crackdown on Solidarity and the fate of Lech Walesa was unknown. Pope John Paul II had just sent scientific emissaries to the capitals of four nuclear weapon States (significantly, not to Beijing, with which the Vatican has no relations) to explain to them the scientific consequences of nuclear war. The scientists visiting President Reagan told him that he received eight pints of blood when he went to the hospital after the attempt on his life. If five or ten people would come to his hospital with similar injuries, the hospital would be unable to handle the situation. Yet 800,000 people would be casualties from burns and radiation if a one megaton bomb exploded over Washington, and even the hospital itself would likely be destroyed in a nuclear attack. Thus there is no winning or even surviving nuclear war. This, then, was part of the political environment in which I wrote this lecture.

The temptation is strong to give a discourse on all aspects of disarmament. In many ways, disarmament is the queen of the sciences - as theology was thought to have been during certain other times in history. Disarmament involves a great many disciplines: ethics, geography, law, physics, politics, sociology, theology. However, I can make perhaps a greater contribution to your thinking by concentrating in this lecture on only one aspect of the total field of disarmament: namely, how to lessen the nuclear threat facing humanity today.

Given these limitations, I will not describe the effects of the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I will not describe what Prof. Robert Neild of Cambridge University has aptly called being "Hiroshima'd". I will not further describe what scientists, especially physicists, tell us the devastation would be with larger hydrogen bombs dropped on a city or country. Nuclear weapons have one effect which makes them unique. It is not their great destructive power which sets them apart. Admittedly, a large nuclear weapon can have the explosive power of all weapons detonated in human history; yet mini-nukes can cause but limited physical damage. Thus the uniqueness of nuclear weapons is their

impact over both geography and time. They are the ultimate indiscriminate weapon because of the radioactive fallout they produce. Not only is the so-called enemy or adversary exposed to radioactivity, but also human beings half-way around the world, and indeed those living in the country of the leader who pressed the button. Not only does the nuclear weapon know no geographical bounds, it knows no generational limits. Radioactive fallout can affect human beings years after the detonation occurs, genetically through many generations. Prof. Joseph Rotblat, the 1964 Essex Hall lecturer, in a new book just published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), concluded: "The effects of local fallout would be felt just as badly in some non-combatant countries, but global fallout would result in long-term damage to *all* countries." (ref 4)

To keep this lecture within bounds, I will also not be able to discuss the probability of a nuclear detonation in the early future. There have been various calculations of probability, but I can only suggest - subjectively - that the prospects to me seem increasingly high for a nuclear detonation to occur soon, by calculation or miscalculation, by accident or terrorism. Kurt Waldheim, in his final speech to the U.N. General Assembly as Secretary-General, last December, asserted that "the nuclear threat overshadows virtually the entire human family."

Finally, I will not discuss in depth the relation between nuclear and conventional arms. The continuum from conventional arms to nuclear is direct, although the "fire break" between the two types of weapons continues and should at all costs be maintained. I will, however, concentrate on eliminating the threat of nuclear arms, admitting that some modern, conventional weapons can be as devastating as nuclear arms - as they indeed were shown to be in Dresden and Tokyo toward the end of World War II. Disarmament involving *both* conventional and nuclear weapons is preferred, yet the urgency of nuclear disarmament is, I submit, greater. If we can make progress in eliminating nuclear weapons, the same political tools can be used to make progress in eliminating conventional ones.

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## Current Efforts.

The international community has taken many routes, in 36 years, to try to end the nuclear threat, to try to put the atomic genie back into the bottle. Eleven of these methods I will now briefly enumerate.

**1. MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION:** This is nuclear deterrence, with the understandable acronym of MAD. Nuclear weapons will never be used, according to the theory of deterrence, because their use will invite instant retaliation and unacceptable destruction. Thus if there is rough nuclear parity or equivalence, there will not be nuclear war.

We must admit that deterrence has been in operation ever since the Soviet Union acquired nuclear capability, and, during this time, it may have been effective. My own judgment is, however, that nuclear deterrence is unethical and immoral and also that, in the end, it will not work. The morality of nuclear deterrence has long been debated. Last December, Terence Cardinal Cooke of New York asserted that "as long as our nation is sincerely trying to work with other nations to find a better way (than deterrence), the church considers the strategy of deterrence morally tolerable; not satisfactory, but tolerable." (ref 5) Other religious leaders responded quickly and asserted that taking hostage not only a single nation but all humanity to avoid nuclear war is intolerable and immoral. Also nuclear deterrence has been criticized on pragmatic grounds. Prof. Karl Deutsch showed the contradictions of the deterrence theory since it "first proposes that we should frustrate our opponents by frightening them very badly and that we should rely then on their cool-headed rationality for our survival." (ref 6)

A recent U.N. study on nuclear weapons also asserted: "Even if the balance of deterrence was an entirely stable phenomenon, there are strong moral and political arguments against a continued reliance on this balance. It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security. The future of mankind is then made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon States and most notably that of the two Super-Powers ... So long as reliance continues to be

placed upon the concept of the balance of nuclear deterrence as a method of maintaining peace, the prospects for the future will always remain dark, menacing, and as uncertain as the fragile assumption upon which they are based." (ref 7) This is the conclusion of a group of experts appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General. None of the five nuclear weapon States cooperated with this study, but it remains a landmark document nonetheless.

**2. MINIMUM DETERRENT.** This method to prevent nuclear war is also based on deterrence, but using a much lower level of weapons. Instead of a total of between 15,000 and 20,000 strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to keep the so-called balance of terror, there would be perhaps "only" 200 weapons on each side. This, it is said, would be sufficient to deter "unacceptable damage". More nuclear weapons would only constitute over-kill.

My own feeling is that a minimum deterrent is also immoral, although it does have the advantage of greater safety. Certainly the world community can watch over 400 strategic nuclear weapons more easily than 15,000 or 20,000 - to prevent at least a nuclear accident or nuclear terrorism. And double these latter numbers to include so-called tactical nuclear weapons.

**3. NUCLEAR COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY.** These are efforts, by both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. since the 1960s, to make nuclear weapons usable and nuclear war thinkable and therefore winnable. A wide variety of sophisticated weapons are required to carry out a massive, pre-emptive first strike: stationary missiles in well-hardened silos, bombers on quick alert status, and missile submarines.

I am appalled by this growing conviction of otherwise sane leaders that nuclear wars can be limited - and won. The latest Year-book of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) points out the fiction on which counterforce is based: "hope that the weapons will work as they are supposed to, hope that control can be maintained, hope that once a war starts both sides will be able to recognise a common point at which all cost-benefit calculations balance and they can stop it, but above all hope on both sides that when 'the time comes', when 'it's eyeball to eyeball', 'they' will blink first and 'we' will win without a shot being fired. These hopes

have extremely fragile foundations." (ref 8)

4. **OUTLAWING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.** There has been a long history of humanity attempting to outlaw not only war itself, but the most indiscriminate weapons. Such limitations occurred even in the nineteenth century. In more recent times, the Geneva Protocol was signed in 1925, prohibiting the use in war of biological and chemical weapons. In 1981 a further limitation occurred with the treaty outlawing the use of napalm and some other so-called indiscriminate weapons. However, the world community has never signed a treaty outlawing the use of nuclear weapons and making such a use a crime against humanity. The nearest this occurred was last December when the U.N. General Assembly did adopt a declaration against the first use of nuclear weapons. This solemnly proclaimed that "States and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the greatest crime against humanity." This resolution was approved, but only by 82 members of the 157-member General Assembly. Of the 19 negative votes, 14 were members of NATO, including the U.K. and the U.S.A. This resolution of the General Assembly is, in any case, not binding on Member States; it would take a treaty or a Security Council resolution to do so.

My own belief is that a treaty outlawing *all* use - not only first use - of nuclear weapons should be promptly negotiated, signed, and ratified. This would not be a complete answer to the elimination of nuclear weapons, but it is one positive step the world community could take immediately.

5. **ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES.** These are geographical areas free of nuclear weapons - their testing, use, manufacture, acquisition, or stockpiling. This is another attempt to confine nuclear weapons. Antarctica is, in a sense and by a 1961 treaty, a nuclear-free zone; so is outer space after the ratification of a 1967 treaty. But for the inhabited parts of our earth, it has been harder to obtain agreement to set up such nuclear-free zones. The States of Latin America have done so, painfully, over many years, and now all five nuclear weapon States recognize and respect this zone, although the diplomatic paper work is still not complete, with Brazil and Chile exhibiting some reservations. However, efforts to make the Nordic States, the Balkans, the continent of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia nuclear-free zones have so far failed.

Also, in theory, individual countries could legally declare themselves nuclear-free zones and ask the nuclear weapon States, perhaps through the U.N. Security Council, to pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

I do believe that nuclear-free zones are a good route to lessening the nuclear threat, even for individual countries. Indeed, individual cities and countries in some parts of the world have already declared themselves nuclear-free zones; this is psychologically important if not legally binding.

6. **NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES.** For some years efforts have been made to draft a treaty, signed by the existing nuclear weapon States, that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. The five nuclear weapon States have made individual declarations to this effect, but each is somewhat different. Attempts by the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva to draft a treaty with uniform language for these assurances have so far eluded agreement.

This is an important, if limited, effort. One day soon it might succeed.

7. **NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.** In 1968 the world community signed a treaty to lessen the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In devising the treaty, two concepts on the spread of nuclear weapons were considered: *horizontal* proliferation to additional nations and *vertical* proliferation, the latter meaning an increase in the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear States exacted a price from the three nuclear weapon States negotiating the treaty - the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S.A. (China and France stood clear of this effort). The price was Article VI: "Each of the Parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." Two review conferences have been held, in 1975 and 1980, by the 114 States which have ratified this Non-Proliferation Treaty. The last conference adjourned in chaos because many of the non-nuclear weapon States felt that the three nuclear weapon States since 1968 did not negotiate nuclear disarmament "in good faith". Indeed, some key countries which are potential nuclear weapon States have never signed this treaty, such as India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa.

This is still an important instrument and has partly been responsible for slowing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Yet unless the nuclear powers demonstrate "good faith" and reduce their own nuclear stockpiles, it is difficult to predict that the so-called non-proliferation regime will last indefinitely. One day, another dozen States could announce that they had acquired nuclear weapons. The world would then be even a more dangerous place than it is today.

8. PHASING OUT NUCLEAR POWER. An increasing number of persons, if not yet States, see a direct connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and feel that the spread of nuclear weapons cannot be stopped unless the manufacture of nuclear power is also stopped.

This is, I know, a controversial position for some, including many non-nuclear States in the Third World which feel that the nuclear weapon States owe them at least access to the so-called "peaceful atom". Yet evidence over three decades has shown that there is no such thing as the peaceful atom and that even some nuclear research reactors can be perverted to produce sufficient nuclear materials for a nation which is determined to manufacture an atomic bomb. Thus for reasons of stopping nuclear proliferation, but also for sheer human safety, the production of electric power by nuclear reactors should be phased out.

9. LESSENING ACCIDENTAL DETONATIONS. Nuclear weapons can be used not only deliberately by warmakers, but also through miscalculation, accident, or terrorism. As the world stockpile of 50,000 tactical or strategic nuclear weapons increases, the chances increase that one weapon will be detonated. The world community has tried to prevent this unauthorized use and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis especially emphasized the importance of such an effort. In 1963 the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. put into operation the "hot line" agreement, a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow to lessen the risk of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or accident. In 1971 the Super-Powers signed an additional agreement to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, one that would result from technical malfunction, human failure, or misinterpreted incident, or unauthorized action.

Despite these and other safeguards (e.g., "double keys" for

U.S. tactical weapons in Europe), there have been a series of harrowing nuclear accidents since 1945. The 1977 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported "100 or more" nuclear weapon accidents and incidents through mid-1976.(ref 9) The Yearbook concluded: "One incontestable fact is that nuclear weapon accidents do occur, are quite frequent worldwide, and occur to probably all the different nuclear weapons systems while these contain nuclear warheads." These conclusions exclude accidents to nuclear power and research reactors, capped by the Three-Mile Island fiasco. The only complete insurance against the detonation of nuclear devices is their complete elimination.

10. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. This is the acknowledged goal of the world community, to eliminate both nuclear and conventional weapons and usher in a world where armed force will be available, not to individual nation-states, but only to the United Nations. General and complete disarmament was seriously considered in the early 1960s, when first the U.S.S.R. and then the U.S.A. submitted draft treaties to the disarmament negotiating committee in Geneva. Yet these plans were left to languish for two decades and are only now being hesitantly revived. There is hope that the Second U.N. Special Session on disarmament, to be held at U.N. Headquarters beginning June seventh, might adopt a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament. This might provide for four stages of disarmament over five years each, looking toward general and complete disarmament by the year 2,000.

Some say that this timetable is visionary and that the Second Special Session will be unable to agree on this schedule, let alone this goal. Others, including myself, feel that 18 years is too long, and that general and complete disarmament must be attained long before the end of our century if humanity is to survive.

11. MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. The conventional route to zero nuclear weapons, and indeed to general and complete disarmament, is for the major nations to negotiate from their present high levels of nuclear arms to none over a period of years. The Final Document of the First U.N. Special Session on disarmament urges this route: "All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament."



The Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, and its several predecessors since 1962, have been trying to negotiate nuclear disarmament. At present, the independent and non-aligned members of this 40-nation Committee cannot even obtain agreement to establish several working groups on nuclear disarmament. The Second U.N. Special Session may adopt a more detailed blueprint for multilateral disarmament negotiations. Alas, blueprints do not disarmament make!

My own conclusion, after observing closely multilateral disarmament negotiations for 25 years, is that the prospects for agreement on major nuclear disarmament appear very limited. While negotiating, each side actually stockpiles more arms as so-called 'bargaining chips'. The advances of technology alone appear to overtake the limited agreements painfully reached. The negotiations become a mere codification of existing arms competition. Thus it appears to me, and I say this very reluctantly, that multi-lateral and even bi-lateral negotiations alone will not rid the world of nuclear weapons. Yet efforts must continue to be made to keep such negotiations going.

These are eleven routes the world community has devised, so far, to lessen the nuclear threat. Yet the threat persists, and probably increases, as nuclear stockpiling increases, as more nations are acquiring the bomb or expertise to make it, and as decision-making time to recall nuclear weapons enroute to their targets is receding.

What has been the dynamic of the escalation of the arms race, despite warnings and even efforts to regulate it? George F. Kennan, in his Albert Einstein Peace Prize Address of almost a year ago, points to the relentless development of nuclear weaponry: "We have gone on piling weapon upon weapon, missile upon missile, new levels of destructiveness upon old ones. We have done this helplessly, almost involuntarily: like the victims of some sort of hypnotism, like men in a dream, like lemmings heading for the sea, like the children of Hamelin marching blindly along behind the Pied Piper. And the result is that we have achieved ... in the creation of these devices and their means of delivery, levels of redundancy of such grotesque dimensions as to defy rational understanding." (ref 10)

Are there any other methods available to reduce and eliminate the nuclear threat? There is at least one more - and that is unilateral

nuclear disarmament. This is the voluntary but deliberate decision of a non-nuclear nation not to acquire nuclear weapons and of a nuclear nation to dismantle and abolish the nuclear weapons it has stockpiled. To some, this is the least likely route to nuclear sanity. To others of us, it may be a likely route, certainly worth the most careful consideration. I want to spend the remainder of this lecture discussing and indeed defending the unilateral route to nuclear disarmament.

### Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament.

In discussing unilateralism, I am in a sense bringing coals to Newcastle, for the concept of unilateralism is being advocated perhaps more in the U.K. and in Western Europe today than in any other part of the world. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has held bravely and wisely to the flag of unilateralism for 25 years. In my own country, the U.S.A., unilateralism is a 13-letter swear word. Many people who advocate disarmament hasten to add, "but not, of course, unilateral disarmament." In the U.S.A., disarmament often has a unilateral implication which somehow is bad and so some of the advocates of disarmament disavow unilateralism just as soon as they possibly can. Let me give but one example. Professor Victor F. Weisskopf, a respected nuclear scientist who was one of the emissaries of Pope John Paul II to President Reagan, in an article in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" went out of his way to assert that "the objective is not unilateral disarmament." (ref 11)

Why this negative reputation for unilateralism? There is a strong psychological dimension here. Disarmament and unilateralism to some people are both a sign of weakness; they are not sufficiently macho, masculine. The symbol of disarmament is Venus without arms! To get around the dubious reputation of unilateralism, some euphemisms have been used, such as national or independent initiatives. Premier Krushchev in his day used the concept of "mutual example". This process is really unilateralism. However, neither the Russians nor the Americans have ever been enthusiastic about unilateral disarmament, although they unilaterally escalate the arms race at various opportunities, usually without consulting allies or adversaries.

I refuse to abandon a good concept, or its name, unilateralism, because it has critics. Indeed, the Final Document of the First

U.N. Special Session on disarmament gives unilateralism honorable mention in the spectrum of routes to disarmament. Suggested by the Government of Spain, the single sentence in paragraph 41 asserts that "unilateral measures of arms limitation or reduction could also contribute to the attainment of that goal" - limiting the arms race.

Unilateralism is not, of course, confined to the field of disarmament. What an individual, or a nation, does in any field can be labelled as unilateral, if it is not done in concert with relevant parties. Thus when Israeli Prime Minister Begin announced that Israeli law would apply to the Golan Heights, he was criticized for taking unilateral action. When President Reagan announced sanctions against the Soviet Union for encouraging martial law in Poland, this was also unilateral action, but hardly labelled as such by the White House!

Unilateralism has a history. Back in the 16th century, in 1543, two Europeans with guns arrived in Japan. At the time Japan was a warlike country, well armed with swords, spears, and bows and arrows, and the principal supplier of these weapons to the whole Far East. Within a year after the Europeans with guns arrived, swordsmiths had manufactured 10 guns, and within a decade guns appeared in military units all over Japan. Yet a century later guns were a rare weapon in Japan, and they remained so for 200 years. What happened was that the 17th century Japanese realized that guns were about to destroy their traditional mode of warfare. At first they ceased research and development on guns, and then gradually ceased to manufacture firearms altogether. They did so without giving up advances in many other fields. This is an example of unilateral disarmament. The Japanese leaders deliberately decided to forego advances in weaponry for other values.(ref 12)

The U.N. commissioned a research paper in 1978 to document instances where nuclear unilateralism was advocated in the U.N. by one or more States.(ref 13) The one recent instance of unilateral nuclear disarmament was in March 1958 when the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union adopted a decree unilaterally suspending nuclear testing and calling upon the U.S.A. and the U.K. also to suspend nuclear tests. The U.S.A. and the U.K. announced that they would stop tests from October 31st, 1958. Although the Soviet Union resumed testing briefly, there were three parallel unilateral moratoria until August 30th, 1961, when the Soviet Union resumed test-

ing, followed by the U.S.A. However, for almost three years there were no nuclear weapon tests. Disarmament experts draw varying lessons from this experiment, yet I believe the moratoria helped produce the partial test-ban treaty of 1963.

Unilateral nuclear disarmament is not a panacea. It is a pragmatic procedure to get the world off its present suicidal course of nuclear holocaust. Unilateral nuclear disarmament is an affirmation of the people and the leaders of one nation, and then many, that they will not wait for the Super-Powers to decide their nuclear fate. It is a statement of determination and of faith. Each category of State may take somewhat different actions, but all would work toward the goal of the quick elimination of all nuclear weapons for all time: "zero nuclear weapons." Even this is not the end, but rather a giant step toward general and complete disarmament and the elimination of national armies and of the institution of war itself. Nothing could be more radical, yet nothing to preserve humanity is more necessary.

The modalities - process - of unilateral nuclear disarmament differ with differing national situations, and certainly with the three obvious categories of States. Unilateral nuclear disarmament is most easy perhaps for the vast majority of States - perhaps as many as 125 - which possess no nuclear weapons, do not depend upon any Super-Power for nuclear protection, and have no present desire to possess nuclear weapons. These States range from those which could easily manufacture nuclear weapons, such as Japan or Sweden, to most Third World States, including some giants such as Indonesia and Nigeria. To date, this potential bloc has not exerted sufficient joint pressure on the Super-Powers and really has never coalesced to do so, not even in the U.N. (The Non-Aligned Group, now numbering about 95 States, is not completely relevant here, since it contains some near-nuclear States such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Iraq, and Pakistan). Through the process of unilateral nuclear disarmament, these 125 non-nuclear States could make a strong impact on world nuclear weapons policy.

Unilateral nuclear disarmament is more difficult, perhaps, for the 12 States, members of NATO, and the 6 States, members of the Warsaw Pact, which do not control nuclear weapons, but depend upon the nuclear armories and the alleged protection or nuclear umbrella of one or another of the Super-Powers. Unilateral nuclear

disarmament would mean that, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic would both opt out of the nuclear relationship with their respective military alliances and nuclear patrons.

Unilateral nuclear disarmament would perhaps be most difficult for the Super-Powers, but also for the U.K., France, and China, not to mention the next-in-line: India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Iraq, and no doubt others. Yet unilateralism involves them also. It must be emphasized here again that unilateralism is not an end in itself, but merely a means, a catalyst. To the degree that the two Super-Powers, or all five nuclear weapon States, reach multilateral agreement toward disarming to zero nuclear weapons, so much the better. Yet it is inherent in unilateralism that individual States, including nuclear weapon States, will do what is right and go it alone if necessary, however more desirable it is for them to join with other States in producing a nuclear-free planet.

### Along the Unilateral Route.

I will now suggest what a nation, any nation, might do if it wants to lessen the nuclear threat and go down the unilateral road. I would suggest six stages of activity, with some differences depending upon the category of the State involved.

The *first stage* for any State, in any of the three categories, would be an internal debate, with the people asking the leaders, or vice versa, to support a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. A great debate must take place, even in non-nuclear States. The leadership must lead, but there is no point in prematurely forcing unilateral nuclear disarmament on an unready people. More than in our present system (where people have been forced to accept nuclear armament without their explicit approval), the unilateral route must be thoroughly understood and wholeheartedly supported by both the leaders and the people. Thus only through a great debate can a nation enthusiastically embark on any plan for unilateral nuclear disarmament.

I have no illusions that this first stage will be an easy one. The American people, for example, fear Russian aggression more than they fear Russian bombs. They now fear communism more than they fear nuclear war. Also there is the psychological problem of numb-

ness, of denial. People tend to put aside that which is too horrible to contemplate - nuclear devastation. The facts about nuclear war, about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, make many people numb. Nuclear devastation turns them off; it inhibits rational action. Thus sloganeering easily takes over: "The Russians only understand strength." "How many divisions does the Pope command?" "Better dead than red." Despite the difficulty many people have accepting unilateralism, it must be rationally and patiently explained. It must be religiously, morally, and ethically examined - as must its alternatives. Unilateralism can be a moral initiative. It can evoke the intonations of the moral leaders of all times, certainly of our times. Unilateralism is the route of Mohandas Gandhi on the Salt Marsh, of Martin Luther King, Jr., walking from Selma to Montgomery, of Anwar Sadat journeying to Jerusalem. The unilateral way can become a religious way, if not *the* religious way.

In engaging in the great debate, one must discuss certain implicit propositions of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Let me try to make them explicit.

1. The present nuclear policies of the nuclear weapon States are leading to nuclear catastrophe. Nuclear deterrence has its limitations; counterforce, nuclear superiority, and other such strategies are even more dangerous. The marathon nuclear disarmament negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, appear to produce few significant results - over two decades.

2. New nuclear policies are needed. These may involve great risks to States and to the people, but no risk is greater than the present drift toward nuclear war. George F. Kennan, although hardly a unilateralist, spoke of these risks: "It will be argued that there would be risks involved ... Is it possible to conceive of any dangers greater than those that lie at the end of the collision course on which we are now embarked? And if not, why choose the greater - why choose, in fact, the greatest - of all risks, in the hopes of avoiding the lesser ones? Can there be - in the light of our duty not just to ourselves (for we are all going to die sooner or later) but of our duty to our own kind, our duty to the continuity of the generations, our duty to the great experiment of civilized life on this rare and rich and marvellous planet - can there be, in the light of these claims on our loyalty, any question as to which course we should adopt?" (ref 14)

3. Unilateral steps to nuclear disarmament can take various

forms, but they are taken by a State or group of States in the initial absence of agreement toward the abandonment of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence and in the absence of initial agreement by the adversary. Unilateralism invites reciprocation by the adversary in time, but is not dependent upon it.

4. Unilateral steps are taken in the conviction that the moral, social, and economic strength of a nation will protect it from its adversaries more than nuclear weapons or nuclear alliances. Prof. Roland H. Bainton of Yale University put it well: "Weakness has no power, but the voluntary renunciation of power is inconceivably impressive. No nation has ever done it. The best a nation has ever done is to be magnanimous. To give up power would be something new. Our situation is new. To dispel distrust, some nation must forfeit an advantage. This is not utopian idealism. It is common sense." (ref 15)

5. Unilateralism if it fails might risk the lives of an entire nation, but the present nuclear policies risk the lives of all humanity and doom future generations.

After the people and their leaders discuss, adopt, and support a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament, then the *second stage* begins. The Head of State or Government would make a declaration to the nation and the world that it is embarking on unilateral nuclear disarmament. This should be a solemn, stirring document. While unilateralism is going it alone, it is also an eloquent plea urging others to join. A unilateral nuclear disarmament declaration would include some of the following political affirmations, depending upon the category of the State involved.

**Affirmation One.** The nation would register its declaration of unilateral nuclear disarmament with the U.N. Security Council and, through it, ask the nuclear weapon States not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against its territory.

**Affirmation Two.** The nation would declare itself to be a nuclear-free zone and invite its neighbors to join it to create an enlarged nuclear-free zone. This means that it will not test, manufacture, acquire, or stockpile nuclear weapons on its territory and it will not allow other nations to do so. This further means that it will ask the International Atomic Energy Agency, or some other appropriate U.N. agency, to certify that it is disarming and that it would

welcome inspectors and control devices at any time on its territory.

**Affirmation Three.** The nation would constantly encourage bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations, regional and globally, but its own disarmament would not depend upon the immediate success of these negotiations.

**Affirmation Four.** The nation would reaffirm its membership in the United Nations and its dependence upon the U.N. for its security.

**Affirmation Five.** The nation would make special efforts to build closer relationships with its neighbors, and especially with any perennial or potential adversaries. It would urge them also to take unilateral steps toward nuclear disarmament.

For non-nuclear weapon nations, would they not be doing what they are now doing? On the contrary, most of the non-nuclear weapon States are not consciously, deliberately non-nuclear. Some have secret - if perhaps ambivalent - nuclear weapons ambitions. Others depend upon the nuclear umbrella of one or another of the Super-Powers, even without a formal, explicit alliance. To make an affirmation of unilateral nuclear disarmament would be an explicit decision to opt out of the nuclear weapons world.

For nations in the second category - those 18 members of nuclear alliances - there would be the additional affirmation: the nation would disengage itself from at least the nuclear protection of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. It would affirm that it does not depend on any nuclear umbrella for security and that it will not allow the stockpiling of any nuclear arms on its soil, or their carriers, and the visits of nuclear warships to its ports.

For nations in the first category - those five or perhaps ten nuclear weapon States - there would be this additional affirmation: the nation would begin to dismantle its nuclear armoury, including carriers of nuclear weapons, and hope to complete the task within perhaps three years. It would invite the U.N. and adversary inspection.

There would be at least four steps: 1 - The State would stop all nuclear weapons tests; 2 - The State would stop the production of fissionable materials, nuclear weapons, and their carriers; 3 - The State would dismantle all existing nuclear weapons and their systems; and 4 - The State would stop research and development of all

nuclear weapons and their carriers, including missile flight tests. I would hope that the U.S.A. might be the first nuclear weapon State to take these steps, but realistically the U.K. might perhaps be the first to do so.

So much for stage two of the process. The *third stage* would be for the nation to work, with other States, to strengthen considerably the peace-making and peace-keeping institutions provided in the Charter of the U.N. but which so far have never been implemented. This would include the establishment of a small but effective standing U.N. peace force, which could take action at the request of the Security Council but without a veto of any permanent member. This peace force, rather than a national military force, would attempt to prevent aggression. Also more U.N. machinery would be put into being for good offices/mediation and for peace-keeping.

The *fourth stage* would be for the States in the process of unilateral disarmament to form an international disarmament caucus in the world community. There is no such bloc today, not even the Group of 21 which is the disarmament caucus consisting of independent and Non-Aligned States, members of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. The Group of 21 performs many important tasks, but it is not a disarmament caucus for the whole U.N. system. One should be established and, in time, it could be even more powerful than the Group of 77 - now 125 States - urging a new international economic order in the world community. There is no reason why an equal number of States, or perhaps more, could not rapidly band together as a non-nuclear caucus in the world community.

The *fifth stage*, but implemented early on, would be for the concerned States to plan for any economic displacement that its new nuclear policies would produce. If certain soldiers, civil servants, or civilian employees, including scientists and technologists, would likely lose their jobs, they would be both compensated and retrained. Industry and workers would be cushioned from the shocks of disarmament measures. The State would begin economic conversion programs to show its good faith and to prevent some of its own people from suffering immediately because of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Experiments toward economic conversion have been tried, both in North America and in the British Isles (e.g. Lucas Aerospace Co.). In a recent, comprehensive report on *The Relationship Between Disarmament and Development*, the U.N. has observed that "there should be no difficulty in gearing the rate of disarmament to the rate at which the resources involved can move

smoothly to alternative activities." (ref 16) But this smooth transition must be planned.

The *sixth stage* would consist of States apportioning the disarmament dividend, allocating the funds saved by disarmament. In the long run, and perhaps in the short run, unilateral nuclear disarmament will save funds. By prior agreement these savings could be split three ways: internal economic development (including economic conversion), world economic development, and civilian defence. The last is important. Unilateralism is not meant to invite aggression, but it aims to discourage aggression without decimating the world. Much thinking has already gone into the problem of the defence of a country, not by the military, but by civilians: civilian defence. The literature is growing (ref 17) and there have been experiments in civilian defence in our time, such as the Norwegians resisting the Nazis, and perhaps today the Polish people resisting their own army. In any case, there must be advance planning on how funds saved through disarmament can be wisely spent.

### Against Human Nature?

Will unilateralism work? Is this whole process, of six or more stages, "against human nature"? We do know that the present nuclear arms race will wipe out human nature! The chances are that unilateral nuclear disarmament could certainly work better than the present system of balance of power and balance of terror, of militarism, of nuclear and other deterrence.

During this experiment in unilateral nuclear disarmament, how should we regard the Super-Powers? I have little faith in the good faith of the Soviet Union. But, as an American, I must confess that I also have little faith in the U.S.A. The U.S. has been reckless and selfish in its handling of the nuclear bomb from the very beginning of the nuclear age. President Truman ordered the use of two atomic bombs without purpose, and without conscience. Most of President Truman's successors as President used on occasion nuclear weapons as threats to pursue American foreign policy. Thus President Kennedy dangerously held the world hostage in the Cuban missile crisis and President Nixon on several occasions called a "nuclear alert", again willing to sacrifice the world to enhance, at the time,

the narrow objectives of American foreign policy. Now President Reagan continues what was the counterforce nuclear policy of President Carter, which holds hostage an entire planet to possible nuclear fallout. George F. Kennan has made an indictment of American initiatives toward nuclear innovation and escalation: "It has been we Americans who, at almost every step of the road, have taken the lead in the development of this sort of weaponry. It was we who first produced and tested such a device; we who were the first to raise its destructiveness to a new level with the hydrogen bomb; we who introduced the multiple warhead; we who have declined every proposal for the renunciation of the principle of 'first use'; and we alone, so help us God, who have used the weapon in anger against others, and against tens of thousands of helpless non-combatants at that." (ref 18)

If American policy has been the driving force for the nuclear arms race, there is little evidence that Soviet policy in these three decades has been any more altruistic, any less reckless. I fear the Russians, not because they are avowed atheists - the leaders of the U.S. have no real religion either - but because of the totalitarian nature of Soviet society. I feel that Soviet leadership isolated from the people - in relative terms more isolated than American leadership - can be more dangerous than American leadership. In a so-called democratic society, there can be more accountability through some free institutions.

Thus one need have no illusions about either Super-Power. However, neither is the enemy. We should try to be even-handed in our opposition. We should assert a plague on both Washington and Moscow. I further recognize that many Europeans have come recently to fear the men in Washington more than the men in Moscow. This even-handed fear is at variance with what one of my countrymen, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., said in a television interview last summer: "I've always said deep in their hearts (Western Europeans) go to bed at night and say thank God America is willing and ready to lead again and to provide the kind of protection they've come to expect from us over 35 years." (ref 19)

The real enemy is the nuclear weapon, nuclear stockpiles, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear war. We should devise strategy to overcome the real enemy, realizing that neither Super-Power will significantly, or permanently, help us in our quest for zero nuclear weapons. Indeed, at the U.N. and in disarmament negotiations,

over more than two decades, I have seen the two Super-Powers cooperate and bolster each other as much as I have seen them compete and shout names at each other.

In going down the unilateral road, we of the West must put communism in perspective. Nobody has done this better than the writer Erich Fromm, in his many books and essays. In 1961, Fromm wrote an influential essay entitled, *The Case for Unilateral Disarmament*. It remains a classic and in it he made a poignant plea to forget communism and rediscover our humanism: "The real threat to our existence is not communist ideology, it is not even the communist military power - it is the hollowness of our beliefs, the fact that freedom, individuality, and faith have become empty formulas, that God has become an idol, that our vitality is sapped because we have no vision except that of having more of the same. It seems that a great deal of the hatred of communism is, in the last analysis, based on a deep disbelief in the spiritual values of democracy. Hence, instead of experiencing love of what we are *for*, we experience hate of what we are *against*." (ref 20)

If we try to regain our vision for humanity and somehow experiment with the exciting process of unilateral nuclear disarmament, the world will not admittedly stand still. New regional tensions are bound to arise, whilst old ones might even get worse. New regional wars might well begin - new Afghanistans, new Polands. Cruel conventional weapons might be used. Terrorists might threaten nuclear blackmail. But the world community could, in the meantime, use carefully its borrowed time - the *gnadenfrist* - to install new peace-making and peace-keeping institutions of the U.N. so that some of the chronic or new tensions might be lessened, if not eliminated.

I have come to the end of my lecture on lessening the nuclear threat, especially through unilateralism. As I indicated with the New Abolitionism, so the New Unilateralism will require the best brains, the most adroit strategy, and the greatest sacrifices of each of us, and - above all - the deepest prayers and meditation. We might not succeed, but we must surely try. As the Quakers, we religious liberals must not be attached to success. We must, however, always be eager to experiment. Nothing is more important for peace and justice - and survival - today than to dismantle every one of the more than 50,000 existing nuclear weapons.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, I had the privilege of knowing Albert Schweitzer and visiting him at his hospital in what is now Gabon, in equatorial Africa. Schweitzer, in the ninth decade of his life, and as a Nobel peace laureate, was consumed with the problem of preventing nuclear war. The last time I saw Schweitzer, in 1962, I asked him if he had any message to his friends in Europe and America. "Yes," he said, "Bark out against nuclear tests and nuclear weapons, like a dog in the African night!" And so I echo Albert Schweitzer, more than a decade after his death. I urge each of you to bark out against nuclear madness, like a dog in the Welsh night.

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These footnotes and references do not cite two authors who have written extensively on unilateralism, and deserve credit for original thinking in this area: Prof. Charles E. Osgood of the University of Illinois and Prof. Mulford Sibley of the University of Minnesota.